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1. Introduction 
 
  The transition to a stable, well-regulated, and competitive banking system in 
Bulgaria has been a long and tortuous process.  The legal framework for commercial 
banking was established soon after the introduction of market reforms in the early 1990s 
and led to the rapid increase in the number of private banks, the consolidation of 
numerous state-owned banks, and the entry of foreign banks into the market. However, 
the sector continued to be dominated by inefficient state-owned banks burdened with 
nonperforming loans stemming from lending to loss-making state-owned enterprises and 
relying on financial support from the government.  Bad governance, weak regulatory 
oversight, unsound credit policies, and lack of privatization efforts contributed to the 
deterioration of the balance sheet of the banking system culminating in a severe banking 
crisis and a wave of bank failures in 1996-97. The adoption of a currency board  in the 
aftermath of the crisis signified a fundamental change in the institutional framework of 
the banking sector introducing new prudential requirements for commercial banks, 
eliminating the soft budget constraint, and strengthening the regulatory and supervisory 
powers of the Bulgarian National Bank. In the first half of the 2000s, banking legislation 
underwent another major revision to comply with European Union (EU) banking 
directives in the process of EU accession. Moreover, the government initiated the 
privatization of state-owned banks in 1997 a ttracting a number of strategic foreign 
investors. As a result, by the time Bulgaria joined the European Union on January 1, 
2007, over 80 percent of banking assets were controlled by foreign banks and over 98 
percent were privately owned.   3 
  The objective of this paper is to estimate the efficiency of Bulgarian banks and its 
changes over the period between the adoption of the currency board and the membership 
in the EU, and to examine the impact of ownership, institutional reforms, EU accession, 
and bank-specific financial factors on efficiency. The issue of bank efficiency in Bulgaria 
deserves attention for several reasons. As the newest and least developed member state, 
Bulgaria is in the process of catching up with the rest of the E U. An inefficient banking 
system which hampers  financial development and is detrimental to  economic growth 
would  undermine the process of  convergence. In addition, Bulgaria is the only EU 
member along with Estonia and Lithuania operating a currency board that eliminates or, 
as in the case of Bulgaria, limits the availability of a lender of last resort to situations 
which threaten to destabilize the financial system. This intensifies the danger of bank 
insolvency and a banking crisis if financial institutions are inefficient and face liquidity 
problems. Last but not least,  the period examined in the paper witnessed numerous 
institutional reforms of the financial system aimed at dealing with the 1996-97 banking 
crisis and attaining legal and regulatory harmonization in the wake of the EU accession. 
The assessment of bank efficiency changes  over this period  can provide valuable 
feedback to regulators and policy-makers about the effectiveness of these reforms.  
The empirical analysis is conducted in two stages. First, we  employ a non-
parametric methodology to estimate technical, allocative, and cost efficiency of Bulgarian 
banks over the period 1999-2007. Differences in efficiency levels between state-owned, 
private, and foreign banks, as well as between large and small banks are explored. In 
addition, efficiency changes and their contribution to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) are 
assessed and compared over the periods preceding and following the Treaty of Accession   4 
and the EU membership. In the second stage, we use a panel-data Tobin regression model 
to identify the determinants of the previously estimated technical, allocative, and cost 
efficiency levels. A set of potential correlates of efficiency are included in the regression 
accounting for 1) institutional changes, such as banking reforms, privatization, and 
enterprise restructuring, 2) accession-related events, such as the Treaty of Accession and 
the EU membership, and 3) bank-specific factors related to profitability, credit risk, 
liquidity, and capitalization.    
The paper contributes to the literature by examining the levels and determinants 
of bank efficiency under a currency board in a transition economy that has joined the EU. 
Previous studies described in the next section have included Bulgaria in their efficiency 
analysis but mostly in a comparative context, whereby the sample of Bulgarian banks was 
relatively small and separate estimates were often not reported. Our data which was 
obtained from the Bulgarian National Bank and carefully checked against alternative data 
sources includes all commercial banks operating in Bulgaria and covers almost the entire 
period from the introduction of the currency board to the membership in the EU. This 
allowed us to evaluate the impact of EU accession on bank efficiency, an issue that has 
not been addressed by previous research. We employed a non-parametric methodology 
which is only one of several possible approaches to measuring efficiency but has several 
decisive advantages over the alternatives. It is a data driven approach which creates a 
benchmark against which relative efficiency can be assessed. Furthermore, the non-
parametric methodology relaxes restrictive assumptions common to the  parametric 
analysis of efficiency, allows the decomposition of cost efficiency  into technical and   5 
allocative components, and enabled us to measure the contribution of efficiency change 
to TFP.  
  Our results indicate that bank efficiency in Bulgaria improved over the sample 
period, and especially after 2005. In line with the literature, foreign banks were found to 
be more efficient than domestic private banks, but the gap narrowed significantly in the 
latter years of the sample period. State-owned banks were the least efficient, but achieved 
efficiency gains after being privatized.  Furthermore, the results show that technical 
efficiency change became the major driving force behind TFP in the banking sector after 
2005. Capitalization, profitability, liquidity, and market share were all found to be 
positively correlated with efficiency. Enterprise restructuring helped banks become more 
efficient, whereas banking reforms had the opposite effect. The Treaty of Accession and 
EU membership might have contributed to efficiency improvements although more 
research is needed based on observations over longer periods of EU membership. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an 
overview of the literature on bank efficiency in transition economies. The nonparametric 
methodology is described in Section 3, and the data and variables used in Section 4. 
Section 5 summarizes the results and the final section draws conclusions.  
 
2. Review of the literature  
  The literature on bank efficiency in transition economies can be divided into two 
categories. One group of studies has focused on bank efficiency within a given transition 
economy, including Hungary (Hasan and Marton, 2003), the Czech Republic (Weill, 
2003; Matousek and Taci, 2004), Croatia (Kraft and Tirtiroglu, 1998; Jemric and Vujcic,   6 
2002), Poland (Nikiel and Opiela, 2002; Havrylchyk, 2006), Ukraine (Mertens and Urga, 
2001), and Romania (Asaftei and Kumbhakar, 2008). The sample period of these studies 
mostly covers the 1990s but none of them included the years preceding and following the 
first and second EU expansions in Eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, respectively. All 
studies suggest that foreign-owned banks were more  efficient than domestic banks 
although the issue seems to be more nuanced. For instance, foreign greenfield banks 
scored higher than domestic banks acquired by foreign owners (Havrylchyk, 2006). 
Moreover, foreign banks servicing foreign and business customers achieved higher cost 
efficiency relative to foreign banks with domestic customers which were at par with 
private domestic banks (Nikiel and O piela, 2002).  In contrast to privatization, the 
tightening of prudential requirements with respect to capital adequacy and required 
reserved seems to have had a negative effect on efficiency as it imposed higher costs on 
banks (Asaftei and Kumbhakar, 2008). As for the effect of bank size on efficiency, the 
evidence from most studies suggests that large banks had an advantage over small banks, 
although in a few cases this difference was found not to be statistically significant 
(Matousek and Taci, 2004; Havrylchyk, 2006).  
Nenovsky, Chobanov, Mihaylova, and Koleva (2008) is the only study in this 
group that has focused on the efficiency of Bulgarian banks. Their results indicate that 
the average level of technical efficiency between 1999 and 2006 was 0.78 and increased 
over time. In addition, foreign-owned banks were found to be more efficient than 
domestic private banks, however state-owned banks surprisingly appeared to be the most 
efficient group which was probably due to the limited size of the sample.    7 
  A second group of studies is comparative in nature and has estimated bank 
efficiency within a group of transition economies. Fries and Taci (2005) used bank data 
from 15 transition economies over the period 1994-2001 and found that private banks 
were more c ost efficient than state-owned banks. In particular, privatized banks with 
majority foreign ownership achieved higher levels of efficiency than those with domestic 
ownership. Moreover, their study showed that total costs decreased during the initial 
stages of bank reform but rose at the more advanced stages. The 19 Bulgarian banks 
included in the sample had an average cost efficiency level of 0.42 which was the lowest 
in the entire sample. When country-specific factors were included, it rose to 0.62 which 
was still below the sample average.  
Grigorian and Manole (2006) studied 17 transition economies over the period 
1995-98  and reported that consolidation in the banking sector and the privatization to 
foreign owners  had a positive effect on efficiency. In addition, they found that some 
prudential requirements such as tighter minimum capital adequacy ratios improved 
efficiency, whereas others such as limits to the exposure to a single borrower did not have 
a statistically significant effect. Between 10 and 17 Bulgarian banks were included in the 
sample however they represented less than 30 percent of total assets of the banking 
system. Nevertheless, the results indicate that their efficiency levels improved from an 
average of 0.55 during the banking crisis in 1996-97 to 0.71 in 1998 making them the 
most efficient in Eastern Europe and the Baltics and at par with the more advanced 
transition economies in Central Europe.  
Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel (2005) compared profit and cost efficiency of banks 
in 11 transition economies over the period 1996-2000. They found that banks controlled   8 
by an international institutional investor were the most efficient, followed by foreign-
owned banks. However, efficiency of state-owned banks was not statistically 
significantly different from that of private domestic banks. In addition, bank size was 
found to be negatively correlated with efficiency.  Although the sample included 17 
Bulgarian banks, their efficiency was not reported separately from the sample averages. 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) estimated cost and profit efficiency of banks in 
12 transition countries from 1993 to 2000.  Their findings suggest that  foreign-owned 
banks were more cost-efficient but less profit-efficient relative to state-owned and private 
domestic banks. In addition, market concentration was found to be negatively related to 
efficiency, whereas bank size was associated with higher levels of efficiency. Bulgaria 
was not included in the sample. 
Stavarek (2006)  compared the  technical efficiency of banks in  9 transition 
economies with those from Greece and Portugal over the period 2001-2003 and found 
that even the most efficient banking sectors in Central and Eastern Europe performed 
worse than the two least developed members of the EU before the expansion of 2004. 
However, the efficiency levels in transition economies rose significantly over the sample 
period with Bulgaria achieving the largest improvements in the sample. The 12 Bulgarian 
banks included were the least efficient in 2001 with a score of 0.32 but managed to climb 
to a level of 0.72 in 2003. 
The analysis by Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou (2008) is the only one from 
the group of comparative studies that includes the first two years after the 2004  EU 
accession of 8 transition economies. Their sample consists of 10 transition economies 
over the period 1994-2005. The results indicate that bank reforms, foreign ownership,   9 
and private ownership all had a positive effect on productive efficiency. Bulgarian banks 
are included in the sample, although their exact number is not reported. The average 
productive efficiency of Bulgarian banks over the sample period was estimated at 0.71 
and has remained remarkably stable. Surprisingly, productive efficiency appears to have 




  According to  Farrell (1957)’s seminal work,  the concept of  efficiency 
encompasses two aspects of  firm performance.  To achieve technical efficiency, firms 
seek to minimize the quantities of inputs used in producing a given level of output under 
the assumption of fixed factor proportions. In addition, firms also  pursue allocative 
efficiency by evaluating input prices and choosing a  combination of inputs that 
minimizes the cost of production. Combined, technical and allocative efficiency provide 
an overall efficiency measure, often referred to in the literature as cost efficiency. In 
practice, the efficiency of a firm is evaluated relative to a reference point on a benchmark 
production  frontier. The efficiency measure is a radial measure of the distance between 
the firm and the best-practice frontier calculated as the ratio of actual to potential firm 
performance. Accordingly, a firm is considered efficient if its performance corresponds 
to a point on the best-practice frontier. In this case actual and potential performances are 
identical resulting in an efficiency score of 1.  In contrast, a score of less than 1 is 
associated with inefficient firms located below the frontier due to their poor performance 
relative to their potential.     10 
  The radial measure of efficiency relies on the existence of a  benchmark 
production frontier which is not observed in practice. Two main approaches have been 
developed  in the literature  to  deal with this issue.  Parametric methods, such as  the 
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), use econometric techniques to estimate a frontier 
and decompose the stochastic term of the regression  model into  an  inefficiency 
component  and random error. Non-parametric methods, such as Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), use mathematical programming to construct a   piecewise linear 
production frontier that envelopes the observed data points and treats all deviations from 
the frontier as inefficiency. In the literature on bank efficiency in transition economies, 
Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), Hasan and Marton (2003), and 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) have used SFA, whereas Grigorian and Manole (2006), 
Jemric and Vujcic (2002), Stavarek (2006), and Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou 
(2008) have opted for DEA. In this study we adopt the DEA methodology to estimate the 
efficiency of Bulgarian banks because the non-parametric approach allows the data to 
determine the form of the frontier without imposing any restriction that might misspecify 
the production technology. In other words, this methodology is data driven rather than 
based on theory. Although SFA has the advantage of taking into account random error, it 
requires a priori specification of the functional form of the frontier and  makes 
assumptions about the distributional properties of the components of the stochastic term 
which are often violated (Greene, 1999). 
  At first, we estimated the technical efficiency of Bulgarian banks by solving the 
following input-oriented linear programming model developed by Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984):   11 
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where xij and yrj denote the levels of the ith input and rth output of the jth bank, j=1,…, n. 
The first two constraints require that the performance of a given bank o in terms of  its 
inputs xio and outputs yro is located within a production possibility set defined by the 
envelopment of all data points. The last two constraints, where ?j is an Nx1 vector, allow 
for variable returns to scale by imposing a convexity restriction  which generates a 
frontier in the form of a convex hull of intersecting planes. This condition accounts for 
the fact that the banks in the data set do not necessarily operate at an optimal scale and 
ensures that an inefficient bank is compared only with banks of a similar size. The scalar 
?* which is the optimal solution  of the minimization problem in Eq. 1 represents the 
efficiency score of a given bank. If ?*=1, the bank is located on the best-practice frontier 
and is thus efficient, whereas 0<?*<1 indicates inefficiency. 
  To examine changes in the efficiency scores of each bank over the sample period 
we employed the Malmquist Index, a widely-used DEA-based measure of  TFP growth. 
Following Färe, Grosskopf, and Zhang (1994), the Malmquist Index measuring the 































      (2)   12 
 where  t d  and  1 + t d  are the technical efficiency scores calculated using the DEA model in 
Eq. 1 and evaluated relative to the frontier in period t and t+1, respectively. The TFP 
growth  in Eq. 2  can be decomposed into technical efficiency change (TEC) and 
technological change (TC) as follows: 
TC TEC TFP · =           (3) 
  Technical efficiency change measures the variation in the distance of the firm’s 
performance to the best-practice frontier between two points of time and is given by: 
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d + + + =          (4) 
TEC is thus the ratio of the efficiency score in t+1 to its level in t and represents a 
movement towards or away from the frontier.  TEC>1 indicates that the technical 
efficiency of the firm is improving by [(TEC-1)x100] percent as the firm catches up with 
the best-practice frontier.  TEC<1 indicates a deterioration in technical efficiency 
resulting in a growing distance between the firm’s performance and the best-practice 
frontier. 
The second component of TFP growth is technological change which measures 
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Technological change thus represents the geometric mean of two ratios. The first 
ratio involves the efficiency of firm performance in  t evaluated with respect to the 
frontiers in t and t+1. The second ratio focuses on the efficiency of firm performance in 
t+1 relative to the frontiers in t and t+1. TC>1 indicates technological innovation leading   13 
to an upward shift of the frontier, whereas TC<1 denotes a downward shift due to regress 
in frontier technology.   
Next, we make use of the data on input prices and estimate the cost efficiency by 
solving the following linear programming model based on Farrell (1957): 
0
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where the constraints, including variable returns to scale, are identical to the model in Eq. 
1 but the goal is to minimize the production cost represented by the product of the input 
xio and its corresponding price cio. The optimal solution is the input vector x* which when 
multiplied with the input-price vector c determines the minimal cost. The cost efficiency 
(CE) score for each bank is then obtained by evaluating the minimal cost cx* relative to 





=             (7) 
where 0<CE=1 and the bank is cost efficient only if CE=1. Given that cost efficiency can 
be decomposed into technical (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) as follows:   
   
AE TE CE   · =           (8)   14 
we are able to estimate the AE by dividing the estimate from Eq. 7 by the estimate from 
Eq. 1. Whereas TE is concerned with the distance between the bank performance and the 
best-practice frontier, AE measures the distance between the reference point on the 
frontier and the cost line. Full allocative efficiency defined as AE=1 is achieved if a bank 
has an optimal combination of inputs and costs which corresponds to a location on the 
cost line. Consequently, full cost efficiency is attained only if a bank has perfect scores in 
both technical and allocative efficiency and is thus located on both the best-practice 





The data set included all commercial banks  in Bulgaria over the period 1999-
2007. The number of banks in each year varied between 29 and 35. Since the  DEA 
measures the efficiency of producing multiple outputs using a set of inputs, the choice of 
input and output variables is of great significance f or the resulting estimates. We based 
our selection of variables on the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) 
which focuses on the traditional role of banks as financial intermediaries that collect 
deposits and convert them, using labor and capital, into loans and other earnings assets.
1 
Accordingly, we defined three inputs and two outputs. The inputs included labor, capital, 
and borrowed funds. Labor was measured as the number of bank employees, and capital 
as the value of fixed assets. Borrowed funds were the sum of total deposits and short- and 
long-term borrowings. The two outputs were total loans and investment assets.  
                                                  
1 The alternative production approach (Sherman and Gold, 1985) argues that banks use labor and capital to 
produce loans and deposits. It justifies treating deposits as output rather than input by pointing out that 
transaction services provided by banks to depositors create value added as well. In the literature on bank 
efficiency in transition economies, the production approach has been adopted by Grigorian and Manole 
(2002) and Fries and Taci (2004).    15 
Data on the number of employees was provided by the Bulgarian National Bank 
(BNB). All other variables were collected from  year-end  balance sheets and  income 
statements published by BNB in the bulletin Commercial Banks in Bulgaria. Nominal 
variables expressed in Bulgarian Leva (BGN) were deflated by the consumer price index 
with 2005 as base year.  Given that DEA efficiency estimates are sensitive to 
measurement errors, it was important to address the data quality issues stemming from 
poor accounting standards and weak regulatory supervision common to all transition 
economies. To reduce the possible impact of these problems we used data published by 
BNB, verified it against an alternative database, and focused on the later years of 
transition when financial reporting standards improved significantly. The introduction of 
a currency board in the aftermath of the 1997 banking crisis was accompanied by the 
adoption of a new institutional framework which strengthened bank regulation and 
supervision and led to a more strict enforcement of the rules. Moreover, the rapidly 
increasing market share of foreign banks from member states of the EU since the late 
1990s improved compliancy with  international accounting principles. This process was 
further enhanced by the implementation of EU banking directives in the period leading 
up to the Treaty of Accession. Banks began adhering to the International Accounting 
Standards in their financial reporting in 1999 which was chosen as the first year of the 
sample period.  In addition, w e also checked the data  against  financial  information 
reported in the reputable BankScope database that has been widely  used in previous 
studies on banking efficiency but has a less comprehensive coverage of Bulgarian banks 
than the BNB data. The fact that only a few insignificant differences were found was 
further evidence for the high quality of the data used.     16 
Besides input and output variables, cost efficiency analysis required also data on 
input prices for each bank. In line with the literature, we defined the price of borrowed 
funds as the ratio of interest expenses to borrowed funds, the price of labor as the ratio of 
personnel expenses to the number of employees, and the price of capital as the ratio of 
operating expenses (net of interest and personnel expenses) to fixed assets.
2 While 
interest expenses and operating expenses are available from the BNB bulletin, personnel 
expenses are not reported separately for each bank. Instead, since 2003 the BNB has been 
providing aggregate  annual  data on personnel expenses for three groups of banks 
arranged according to asset size and ownership. We calculated the personnel expenses as 
a percentage of non-interest operating expenses for each  of the three groups and used 
these ratios to estimate the  annual personnel expenses for each bank over the period 
2003-2007. Although BankScope reports personnel expenses by bank, they were not used 
because of incomplete data for some banks and years in our sample. Nevertheless, the 
correlation between our estimates and the actual personnel expenses  available  from 
BankScope for each year varied between 0.95 and 0.98. 
The descriptive statistics of the input, output, and price variables are summarized 
in Table 1. The mean value of loans adjusted for inflation  increased from 215 million 
BGN in 1999 to 1.4 billion BGN in 2007. The mean value of investment assets was very 
small in comparison (26 million BGN in 1999) but increased rapidly over the sample 
period reflecting the development of capital markets and investment opportunities for 
Bulgarian banks. The number of employees per bank remained relatively stable at around 
                                                  
2 For the price of capital we used alternatively the ratio of operating expenses (net of interest and personnel 
expenses) to total assets, however this did not result in any significant changes in the cost efficiency 
estimates.    17 
630 until it rose rapidly to over 1000 in the last three years of the sample period mainly as 
a result of a few large-scale mergers and takeovers.  The mean value of borrowed funds  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the input, output, and price variables 
 
Year        1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
 
Number of banks      34    34   35   34   35    35   33    32    29 
                     
Outputs 
 
Loans    Mean    215  266  285  324  375  523  714    894  1369 
    SD    354  470  427  415  450  624  826  1025  1645 
 
Investment   Mean    26  17  18    38    55    54    82    91    80 
assets    SD    98  64  72  138  180  159  182  179  146 
 
                     
Inputs 
                     
Employees  Mean      641    638    636  638  612  642  737   826  1054 
    SD    1158  1105  1068  975  802  766  782   831  1145 
 
Fixed assets  Mean       14     16     16    21    19    20    24     27      33 
    SD       23     22     23    36    31    31    33     38      49 
 
Borrowed  Mean     271   292   334  397  463  572  848  1051  1502 
funds    SD     456   471   528  550  601  677  977  1192  1774 
 
                     
Input prices 
                     
Labor    Mean            17.2  18.5  19.0  18.8  18.7 
    SD              9.6  10.0  11.8  11.1  11.0 
 
Capital   Mean              2.4    2.7    2.3    3.5    3.5 
    SD              3.2    3.7    3.3    6.9    7.7 
 
Borrowed  Mean              2.1    2.2    2.3    2.4    2.6 
funds    SD              1.1    1.3    1.1    0.9    0.6 
 
All input and output variables are measured in millions of constant 2005 BGN with the exception of the 
number of bank employees.  
The price of labor is expressed in thousands of constant 2005 BGN. 
The price of capital and of borrowed funds is measured in percent.   18 
 
mirrored the magnitude and increases of loans by reaching a level of 1.5 billion BGN in 
2007 from a level of 271 million BGN in 1999. The average prices of labor and capital 
experienced initial increases but then remained relatively stable, whereas the price of 
borrowed funds exhibited gradual but steady increases.  
The sample of banks was subdivided by ownership (state-owned, private domestic 
and  foreign) and by size (large, medium, small). The reason for selecting these two 
factors was the fact that a handful of large banks have a relatively large market share and 
that bank privatization is a major determinant of bank performance as evidenced by 
previous studies on transition economies.
3 The last state-owned bank of any significance 
was privatized in 2002 making this category obsolete in subsequent years of the sample 
period.4 Banks with foreign ownership of at least 50 percent were treated as foreign. With 
regards to bank size, the categories of large and small banks were defined as the upper 
and lower quartiles of the asset distribution in each year.
5 
Descriptive statistics for the six subsamples are displayed in Table 2.  The 
dominant position of foreign banks  in Bulgaria is evident from the fact that they 
represented two-thirds of all banks and had the highest mean annual value of assets, 
loans, and borrowed funds.  Despite their few numbers, state-owned banks were close 
second in terms of assets over the period 1999-2002 and had the highest average values 
                                                  
3 Cluster analysis would have provided a more rigorous approach to the creation of subsamples, however 
we chose to follow the literature and use only size and ownership so as to make our results directly 
comparable to previous studies on transition economies, none of which employs cluster analysis. 
Furthermore, the factors t hat would have been used in a cluster analysis are included as possible 
determinants of efficiency in the second-stage regression in Section 5.2. 
4 Two state-owned banks continued to operate after 2002 and were included in the sample but the small 
number and their relatively small size were not sufficient to justify a separate category. 
5 Interestingly, despite mergers and takeovers the composition of these two groups remained extremely 
stable over the sample period resulting in a remarkably consistent categorization of banks by size across 
years.  
     19 
of investment assets and fixed capital. In addition, the mean number of employees was 
two to three times higher than that of private banks. Foreign banks had higher labor costs 
and lower costs for fixed capital and borrowed funds than private domestic banks. Large 
banks enjoyed the lowest prices for all three inputs but small banks also paid lower prices 
for labor and borrowed funds than medium-sized banks.       
 
Table 2 
Mean annual values of the variables by ownership and size, 1999-2007 
 
Bank type      State-       Private   Foreign  Large    Medium    Small 
        owned
a      domestic     
 
Number of banks      3-7          6-10    19-23     6-9     15-20        7-9 
 
Total assets       784           494      880    2316       441         77 
                     
Outputs 
Loans         446           334      648    1633       324         53 
Investment assets        66             43        54      192         16           5 
                 
Inputs                     
Employees               1954           693      836    1959       456         89 
Fixed assets         39             16        23        64         12           3 
Borrowed funds     652           418      721    1886       378         50 
                 
Input prices
b 
Labor  (thousands BGN)      -             13.4            21.1      17.1        19.9      17.2 
Capital  (%)          -     2.6          2.2        2.0          2.3        2.8 
Borrowed funds (%)        -     3.0          2.1        2.1          2.5        2.2 
 
All variables are expressed in millions of constant 2005 BGN except as noted. 
a Averages for state-owned banks are over the period 1999-2002. 




5.1. Efficiency estimates   20 
  The DEA estimates are reported in Table 3 and indicate that the mean efficiency 
score of Bulgarian banks was 0.83 over the period 1999-2007. From the annual estimates 
it is evident that there i s a significant difference between the periods 1999-2004 and 
2005-2007. Whereas in the first six years of the sample period efficiency fluctuated 
between 0.69 and 0.84 without a clear pattern, it soared above 0.90 in 2005 and remained 
at this relatively high level despite minor decreases in the following years. The reason for 
the lower efficiency in the late 1990s and early 2000s is that most banks were reluctant to 
lend as they were still haunted by the aftermath of the 1996 crisis. This changed in 2004  
 
Table 3 
Technical efficiency by ownership and size, 1999-2007 
 
Year      1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  Mean 
                           
Sample  N     34      34     35     34   35    35   33    32    29 
    Mean  0.81   0.84  0.80  0.69  0.82  0.75  0.93  0.91  0.90  0.83 
   SD  0.20   0.18  0.20  0.30  0.19  0.21  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.18 
    Min  0.06   0.50  0.41  0.11  0.41  0.41  0.70  0.56  0.45  0.40 
                     
State    N       7        4       4       3   
    Mean  0.87   0.65  0.74  0.48            0.69   
 
Private   N       8        9     10     10     10     10       9       7       6 
    Mean  0.72   0.77  0.65  0.52  0.70  0.59  0.89  0.90  0.92  0.74 
 
Foreign  N     19      21     21     21     23     23     22     23     21 
    Mean  0.82   0.90  0.89  0.79     0.89  0.84  0.95     0.93  0.91  0.88 
                     
Large    N       8        9       9       8       7       7       6       7       7 
    Mean  0.88   0.83  0.90  0.95  1.00  0.92  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.94 
 
Medium   N     19      16     17     19     20     20     19     18     15 
    Mean  0.77   0.77  0.73  0.76  0.76  0.68  0.88  0.88  0.90  0.79 
 
Small    N       7        9       9       7       8       8       8       7       7 
    Mean  0.80   0.98  0.83  0.46  0.83  0.77  0.98  0.92  0.82  0.82 
 
   21 
when foreign banks were attracted by higher rates of return and the prospect of Bulgaria’s 
EU accession, poured resources into the financial system through their Bulgarian 
subsidiaries creating a credit boom reflected in the jump in efficiency scores. BNB 
reacted by raising the reserve requirements and imposing restrictions on lending which 
were most likely responsible for the moderate decline in efficiency after 2005. 
  Foreign banks were more efficient than private domestic banks, and their score 
mirrored the overall pattern  of change  of the sample average. By contrast, p rivate 
domestic banks exhibited consistent improvements in technical efficiency since 2005 
thereby surpassing foreign banks in 2007. State-owned banks which were evaluated over 
the first four years of the sample before being privatized recorded the lowest level of 
technical efficiency. Moreover, their efficiency worsened over the years as the best banks 
were privatized first. Foreign banks were the main beneficiaries of privatization and the 
analysis of the f our takeovers in the years 1999-2002 showed that the efficiency of the 
state-owned banks involved increased on average from  0.82 to 0.90  following 
privatization. 
  Large banks were found to be the most efficient subsample with an average score 
of 0.94. They achieved maximum efficiency  in every year since 2005  and  thus 
determined the best-practice frontier. Small banks were less efficient and experienced a 
decline in efficiency after reaching a peak in 2005.  
  The  estimates of the Malmquist I ndex measuring changes in TFP and its 
components are shown in Table 4.6 The average TFP growth rate over the period 2000-
2007 was 3.7 percent. Although technical efficiency improved by 1.4 percent, the 
                                                  
6 This type of analysis requires a balanced panel which limited the size of the sample to 25 banks. 
Institutions founded during the sample period or those that merged together to form a new bank were 
excluded.    22 
contribution of technological change to TFP growth was larger. A comparison between 
the periods before and after the Treaty of Accession revealed the same pattern found in 
Table 3. In 2000-2004, technological change was the only driving force behind TFP as 
efficiency remained largely unchanged. This pattern was reversed after 2005 as technical 
efficiency increased by 4.3 percent and was responsible for TFP growth. In the first year 
of EU membership TFP grew by 6 percent but technical efficiency deteriorated.
7  
  Foreign banks exhibited the largest improvement in technical efficiency and the 
highest growth rate of TFP over the sample period. However, private domestic banks 
surpassed them in both aspects in 2005-2007 by achieving technical efficiency change of  
Table 4 
TFP growth, technical efficiency change, and technological change (in percent) 
 
Period            2000-2007     2000-2004        2005-2007          2007 
                           
Variable  N  TFP  TEC  TC    TFP   TEC       TFP   TEC      TFP   TEC 
 
Sample            25   3.7   1.4  2.3     5.0   -0.7        2.0     4.3        6.0    -7.7   
                       
State
a     4         -9.5      -1.1    -8.5  
 
Private    8   0.4   1.3     -0.9    -2.4  -4.8        4.4   10.2        8.0    -9.1 
 
Foreign           13   5.5   1.6  3.8     7.6     1.7        2.7     1.4         4.8    -5.5 
                     
Large     5   4.9   3.3  1.5   10.6   4.1           -2.4     2.2        8.7    -3.1    
 
Medium          14   1.7   1.3  0.4     0.0    -1.2            4.3     4.7       13.1    -0.3 
 
Small     6   7.4   0.1  7.3   13.0  -3.6            0.4     5.3      -10.7  -22.7 
 
All growth rates are geometric means over the respective period and are expressed in percent (e.g., 
[TFP-1]x100).  
a The values for state-owned firms are geometric means over the period 2000-2002. 
 
                                                  
7 Although this decline in efficiency was already observed in Table 3, its magnitude might have been 
overestimated due to the fact that two large mergers took place in 2007 and the five involved banks were 
excluded from the sample for the estimation of the Malmquist Index.   23 
over 10 percent.  State-owned banks  experienced a severe decline in TFP and 
deterioration in technical efficiency before being privatized. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that TFP growth for large banks relied mostly on technical efficiency change, 
whereas for small banks it was almost exclusively driven by technological change due to 
lack of any efficiency improvements. For 2005-2007 small banks recorded significantly 
higher rates of efficiency change but in 2007 they also experienced a steeper efficiency 
decline than large banks.     
  Table 5 displays the estimates of cost efficiency which represents a measure of 
overall efficiency taking into account technical as well as allocative aspects. It is evident 
that when input prices were included in the analysis the average cost and allocative 
efficiency scores of Bulgarian banks over the period 2003-2007 became 0.63 and 0.72,  
Table 5 
Cost and allocative efficiency by ownership and size, 2003-2007 
 
Year        2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  Mean 
                           
Sample  Mean (CE)  0.53   0.55  0.59  0.72  0.78   0.63    
    SD (CE)  0.28   0.29  0.37  0.25  0.26   0.29   
   Mean (AE)  0.62   0.70  0.64  0.77  0.85   0.72     
    SD (AE)  0.24   0.23  0.39  0.22  0.20   0.26   
               
Private   CE    0.34   0.34  0.65  0.65  0.72  0.54       
domestic  AE    0.49   0.61  0.75  0.72  0.76  0.67     
 
Foreign  CE    0.62   0.66  0.56  0.76  0.81  0.68     
    AE    0.68   0.76  0.59  0.80  0.87  0.74     
                     
Large    CE    0.88      0.85  0.96  0.97  1.00  0.93 
    AE    0.88   0.92  0.96  0.97  1.00  0.95     
 
Medium   CE    0.43   0.48  0.55  0.67  0.76  0.58 
    AE    0.56   0.67  0.63  0.75  0.83  0.69         
 
Small    CE    0.46   0.45  0.42  0.57  0.61  0.50 




respectively. Cost efficiency improved consistently over the years witnessing a larger 
increase in 2006 and reaching a peak of 0.78 in 2007. Foreign-owned banks were again 
more cost and allocative efficient than domestic banks, however the gap between the two 
groups narrowed significantly, especially after domestic banks experienced a dramatic 
boost in efficiency in 2005. Large banks  had again the highest average scores and 
achieved perfect efficiency in 2007. In contrast, small banks were extremely inefficient 
and despite some minor improvements in 2006-2007 remained below the average 
efficiency level for the entire sample.  
 
5.2. Determinants of efficiency 
To identify the determinants of bank efficiency, the DEA estimates were 
regressed on a number of bank-specific and institutional variables using the following 
specification: 
 






z q t q
m
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Three separate regressions were estimated with technical, cost, and allocative efficiency 
as the dependent variable. As DEA efficiency scores are limited to values between 0 and 
1, estimation via OLS would result in inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we employed a 
Tobit specification for panel data which captures the lower and upper censoring of the 
dependent variable and produces consistent Maximum Likelihood estimates.    25 
  The potential correlates of efficiency were broadly grouped into four categories. 
The first addressed issues of ownership and size (OWN) and included dummy variables 
for state-owned and foreign banks as well as a variable for bank size defined as the ratio 
of a bank’s assets to the total assets of the banking system. The second group of variables 
consisted of bank-specific financial indicators which are part of the CAMEL (Capital 
adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earning, Liquidity) Rating System used by 
supervisory b odies, including BNB, to assess bank performance.  From the numerous 
CAMEL indicators we selected the four most frequently used in the literature for which 
data was available in the  BankScope database and the bulletin Commercial Banks in 
Bulgaria. The ratio of equity to total assets was used as a measure of bank capitalization. 
Asset quality was proxied by loan loss provisions as a fraction of total loans. The return 
on assets (ROA) was a proxy for profitability, and liquidity was measured as the share of 
liquid assets in total assets.   
The third group of correlates (INT) controlled for changes in the institutional 
environment in  which  commercial banks operated. In particular, we included three 
variables representing progress in banking reform, large-scale privatization, and 
enterprise restructuring in Bulgaria. Each of the variables was measured by a composite 
index computed by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and reported 
in its annual  Transition Report.  The indices measure institutional development in 
Bulgaria relative to the standards of industrialized market economies and range from 1 
(little or no change from a rigid centrally-planned economy) to 4+ (standards of an 
industrialized market economy).  The banking reform variable assessed progress in 
establishing an effective framework of prudential supervision and regulation,   26 
convergence of banking laws and regulations with international standards, banking 
competition, lending to private enterprises, and the share of private banks.  The large-
scale privatization variable accounted for changes in the share of state-owned enterprises 
and the effectiveness of corporate governance. Lastly, the restructuring variable focused 
on the transition from a soft to a hard budget constraint, the enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation, new investment in enterprises, and the effectiveness of corporate control.  
  The fourth group of variables (EU) examined the impact of EU accession on bank 
efficiency. In particular, dummy variables for the years 2005 and 2007 accounted for the 
effects of the signing of the Treaty of Accession and EU membership, respectively.  
  The results of the Tobit regression are presented in Table 6. The estimated 
coefficients of the ownership dummy variables indicate that foreign banks were 
significantly more cost efficient and more  technically efficient than domestic banks 
which is consistent with the findings of previous studies on transition economies. The  
Table 6 
Results of the Tobit regression analysis of efficiency determinants 
 
Dependent variable      TE    CE    AE 
                           
Constant        0.299    -0.319   -0.708 
          (0.81)    (-0.37)   (-0.88)    
Ownership and size 
 
State-owned        -0.042      
          (-0.77) 
Foreign-owned      0.220***  0.116**  0.065   
          (6.43)    (2.06)    (1.22) 
Market share        0.028***  0.066***  0.056*** 




Equity/Total Assets      0.005***  0.005**  0.002 
          (4.64)    (2.10)    (0.85)   27 
Loan loss provisions/Loans    -0.001   0.015    0.020 
          (-1.23)   (0.80)    (0.18) 
ROA          0.020***  0.021***  0.020** 
          (3.36)    (2.35)    (2.37) 
Liquid assets/Total assets    -0.001   0.003**  0.004*** 




Privatization        0.198     
          (1.50)     
Banking reform      -0.457***  0.114    0.278 
          (-2.95)   (0.47)    (1.22) 
Restructuring        0.401**   




Treaty of Accession      0.248***  0.096    -0.018 
          (5.12)    (1.34)    (-0.26) 
EU Accession       -0.009   0.195***  0.218*** 
          (-0.15)   (2.59)    (3.09) 
 
Period                1999-2007      2003-2007         2003-2007 
Observations        234    145    145 
t-values in parenthesis. ** 5% significance level. *** 1% significance level.  
 
majority of foreign banks in Bulgaria are owned by large and established banks from 
Germany, France, Italy,  and Austria giving them access to advanced technology and 
expertise, better risk management and corporate governance, and capital from their parent 
banks. Moreover, foreign banks have the advantage of counting foreign firms and the 
most creditworthy Bulgarian companies as their clients (Koford and Tscheogl, 2003). 
Greek and Turkish banks, for instance,  followed corporate clients from their home 
countries on the Bulgarian market where they continued servicing their needs. Foreign 
corporate customers have been shown to improve cost efficiency of banks in other 
transition economies (Nikiel and Opiela, 2002).     28 
  State-owned banks  were found to be less technically efficient than private 
domestic and foreign banks, which is also in line with previous research. The coefficient 
for state ownership reported in Table 6 is negative but not statistically significant because 
two major state-owned banks had to be dropped from the sample for the sake of a 
balanced panel dataset over the period 1999-2007. When the model was estimated for the 
years 1999-2003 with all state-owned banks included, this coefficient turned significant. 
With respect to size, it appears that technical, cost, and allocative efficiency were higher 
for banks with a larger market share as they were able to benefit from lower costs and 
economies of scale.  
  The regression results reveal further that capitalization was positively related to 
technical and cost efficiency.
8 A possible explanation is that well-capitalized banks 
attract more deposits as they offer implicit deposit insurance which is reflected in lower 
interest expenses and thus lower total costs.  Moreover, higher returns on assets were 
positively associated with all three types of efficiency.9 The coefficient for the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to total loans  was not statistically significant  for any aspect of 
efficiency. This contradicts Yildirim and Philippatos (2007), Havrylchiyk (2006), and 
Brissimis et al. (2008) who reported a significantly negative relationship between the 
share of impaired assets and efficiency. A look at the data suggests that the subsidiaries 
of foreign banks in Bulgaria had an average provisions-to-loans ratio of only 1 percent 
over the period 2003-2007. However, the average ratio of 3.01 percent for large foreign-
owned banks was only slightly lower than the 3.3 percent for the rest of the banking 
                                                  
8 A number of studies have reported similar results, including Fries and Taci (2005), Grigorian and Manole 
(2006), and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007). 
9 Matousek and Taci (2003) found an overall positive correlation between ROA and cost efficiency for the 
Czech Republic. They further showed that while this was also true for big and foreign banks, the 
correlation was negative for small banks.   29 
sector. In addition, the coefficient of variation decreased over the years as the quality of 
the credit portfolio of less efficient banks improved. 
Liquidity had a positive effect on cost and allocative efficiency.
10  Given t he 
limited role of BNB as a lender of last resort under the currency board, commercial banks 
need to either maintain high liquidity or rely on short-term money markets in the case of 
a liquidity crisis. Keeping a larger share of liquid assets seems to be more efficient as it 
minimizes the costs of borrowing.    
  Enterprise restructuring contributed to higher levels of technical efficiency of 
banks. This reflects improvements in the credit portfolio of banks and an increase in their 
willingness to lend as a result of the hardening of the budget constraint, the risk of 
bankruptcy, and better corporate governance of firms. Large-scale privatization of state-
owned enterprises did not significantly affect technical efficiency of banks.
11 Banking 
reform was negatively associated with technical efficiency but was not significantly 
correlated with cost and allocative efficiency. This result reflects the difference in the 
periods for which the regressions were estimated. Technical efficiency was analyzed over 
the entire sample period and thus included the years 1999-2004 when banking reforms 
were most intense in the aftermath of the banking crisis and in the wake of the Treaty of 
Accession. The regressions of cost and allocative efficiency covered the period 2003-
2007 when banking reforms slowed down which explains the lack of significance of the 
corresponding coefficients. Our results therefore suggest that fundamental reforms of the 
banking system  in Bulgaria  involving for instance tighter reserve and liquidity 
                                                  
10 Hasan and Marton (2003) also showed that a higher share of liquid assets was linked to less cost 
inefficiencies in the case of Hungary.  
11 The indices for large-scale privatization and enterprise restructuring did nor change over the period 2003-
2007 and were therefore excluded from the regressions of cost and allocative efficiency.   30 
requirements affected adversely bank operations and imposed costs which had a negative 
effect on efficiency. This finding is consistent with Fries and Taci (2005) and Asaftei and 
Kumbhakar (2008) but contradicts the positive relationship reported by Brissimis et al. 
(2008).
12  
  Despite the negative relationship between efficiency and banking reforms aimed 
at legal and regulatory convergence with developed market economies, the EU accession 
appears to have boosted efficiency, although this result should be treated with caution due 
to the relatively short period of evaluation. The Treaty of Accession in 2005 marked a 
significant improvement in technical efficiency, whereas the first year of EU membership 
was associated with pronounced gains in cost and allocative efficiency. It is also possible 
that these variations in efficiency during accession and EU membership were magnified 
by other factors such as institutional reforms and financial indicators, as evidenced by the 
regression results. 
   
6. Conclusions 
  In this paper we measured the efficiency of commercial banks in Bulgaria and 
examined its determinants  over the period 1999-2007.  Our findings  indicate t hat 
estimates for the different types of efficiency varied between 0.63 and 0.83, and 
improved over time, exhibiting particularly large gains in 2005. As a result, technical 
efficiency change replaced technological innovation as the major driving force behind 
TFP  growth  in the banking sector after 2005. Foreign banks were found to be more 
                                                  
12 It should be noted again that EBRD’s banking reform variable measures the convergence of institutional 
standards in the Bulgarian banking system to those of mature market economies. A more detailed analysis 
of the various reform measures as conducted by Grigorian and Manole (2006) for a number of transition 
economies suggests that prudential requirements can have differing effects on efficiency.      31 
efficient than private domestic banks, which is consistent with previous research. 
However, the efficiency gains attained by private domestic banks in the years 2005-2007 
helped them catch up with their foreign-owned competitors. State-owned banks were the 
worst performers but their efficiency recovered following their privatization and 
restructuring.  
  Furthermore, our analysis identified a number of financial, institutional, and EU-
related variables that determined efficiency levels of Bulgarian banks over the sample 
period. Profitability, liquidity, and capitalization were shown to have a positive effect on 
efficiency. A larger market share and foreign ownership were also associated with higher 
efficiency levels. Enterprise restructuring boosted bank efficiency as it improved the 
governance and creditworthiness of corporate clients. Bank reforms, on the other hand, 
were inversely related to technical efficiency and had no significant effect on cost and 
allocative efficiency. As previous studies on transition economies have shown, the 
tightening of prudential requirements imposes costs on financial intermediation and may 
adversely affect efficiency, however more research is needed to reveal the reform 
components responsible for efficiency losses.  Our findings also indicate that the 
accession to and the membership in the EU  might  have contributed to marked 
improvements in bank performance. The signing of the Treaty of Accession  in 2005 
coincided with the largest gains in technical efficiency over the sample period, whereas 
the first year of EU membership was associated with advances in cost and allocative 
efficiency, although more research is needed to confirm these f indings over longer 
periods of EU membership.     32 
  The successful privatization of state-owned banks, the dominance of well-
managed foreign banks, the improving efficiency of the banking sector, and the benefits 
of EU accession revealed in this paper reflect the transition of Bulgaria from a slow 
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